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PENN CENTR.A.L TRANSPORTATION CO. - - - ---
v. 
,d /,;l'J:Y OF NEW YORK 
~J -V .Al'1 1 SUMMARY: Under New York City's Landmarks Preservation X; '.:;) Law, G~and Central Terminal and its site have been designated 
;; ,iJ" ~':r "landmark" and a "landmark site,'' respectively. Pursuant to this 
~ law appellants were prevented from undertaking certain construction 
ii"" . 0 )._; I ' 
{)'Y;_,.,,.. JJY inv'olving the Terminal. Appellants contend that, in violation of the 
~ _Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, they have been denied just 
~ r compensation for the property right deprivation imposed·1 by this 
,v r ~ restriction. 




2. FACTS: In 1967, over the objection of Penn Central, 
the Landmarks Presevation Commission of the City of New York 
designated the Terminal and its site as a "landmark" and a "landmark 
site." Under the City's LandmarkS Law, no construction on the 
site and no alteration of the exterior appearance of the Terminal 
are permitted without prior approval by the 
Landmarks Commission. Specifically, before proceeding with 
construction, a landmark owner must seek a "certificate of no 
exterior effect" or, if there will be exterior effect, a permit for 
minor work or a "certificate of appropriateness." 
Related to the Landmarks Law are certain amendments 
to the New York City Zoning Resolution, which permit the transfer 
of unused development rights over landmark properties located in 
certain high density areas of the City to other nearby sites. 
Transferable development rights [TDR's] permit a landmark owner - ~------------------
to convey to a limited number of nearby properties the right to 
develop those
1 
properties. The transferee owners are then permitted 
to build on their properties in a manner that exceeds the otherwise 
applicable zoning regulations. 
In order to reduce its operating losses on the Terminal, 
Penn Centr~l entered, in 1968, a lease with appellant UGP 
Properties, Inc., under which UGP was to construct an office building 
on the Terminal site and pay Penn Central substantial rent for this 
privilege. 
After a design for the office building was 
- 3 -
completed, Penn Centra. submitted the design--in compliance 
with the Landmarks Law--to the Landmarks Commission and applied for 
a "certificate of no exterior effect," the granting of which 
would have permitted the office building to have been 
constructed. This application was denied in September, 1968. 
Penn Central then applied for "certificates of appropria·teness," 
submitting the original plan and two revisions as alternatives. 
The last of these applications was denied on August 20, 1969. 
In October 1969, appellants initiated this action. 
They sought a declaratory judgment, alleging that the actions 
of the Landmarks Connnission constituted a taking of private 
property for Rublic use without just compensation in violation of 
1 
due process :and equal protection. The Trial Term of the New 
York Supreme Court agreed, holding that the Landmarks Law, as applied, 
constituted an unconstitutional taking. .The Supreme Court did 
not attribute any value to the TDR's. 
The City of New York appealed. The Supreme Court's Appellate 
Division reversed the trial court, upholding the constitutionality 
of the Landmarks Law as applied and finding that there had been 
no compensable taking. Two of the five justices dissented, essentially 
adopting the rationale of the trial court. 
1 
Penn Central also sought compensation for the alleged temporary 
taking of the property for the period between its designation as a 
landmark and the judicial invalidation of such a designation. This 






The New York Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the 
decision of the Appellate Division. The Court stated that there 
was "no constitutional imperative" that a property owner's 
economic return "embrace all attributes, incidental influences, or 
contributing external factors derived from the social complex in 
2 
which the property rests." A. 2. In so holding, the Court sought 
to distinguish the "ingredient of property value" created by "the 
efforts of the property owner" from the "ingredient" created ,rby 
the accumulated indirect social and direct government investment 
in the physical property, its functions, and its surroundings." 
A. 1-2, 9. According to the Court, "[i]t is enough for the limited 
purposes of a landmarking statute ... that the privately created 
ingredient of property receive a reasonable return.'' A.2-3. 
? 
Considering only this "privately created ingredient," the Court 
held that Penn Central had failed to prove that it was impossible toe~ 
7 a "reasonable return" on ~ its properties benefited y the --
Terminal's operations, even if the Terminal itself "can never operate 
at a profit." A. 9. 
The Court also held that the unused development rights over 
the terminal could be transferred to a number of other properties 
owned by Penn Central. While conceding the "many defects" of the 
2 
However, the Court also made clear that, in its view, "[t]his is 
not a zoning case." A. 4. -----------
1 
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TDR's and acknowledging that such rights "may not be equivalen t 
in value" to the development rights taken from Penn Central, the 
Court concluded that the TDR's "are valuable" and provide "significant : 
perhaps 'fair', compensation for the loss of rights above the Terminal 
itself." A. 13-14. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appellants contend that the N.Y. Ct. App. 's 
decision contains several related and erroneous propositions 
of law. Most fundamentally, appellants argue tht the Court 
erred in implying that the desirability of preserving historical 
landmarks through government regulation derogates from the 
,__ ___ __,_ 
constitutional requirement that just compensation be paid for the 
public taking of private property. In particular they contend 
the 
that/ finding that Penn Central has failed to establish 
that there is no possibility, without exercising its development 
rights, of earning a reasonable return on all of its 
remmining properties that benefit in any way from the operations of 
the Grand Central Terminal should not have warranted the conclusion 
that no compensation need be paid for the taking of those rights. 
Also, appellants allege that the Court erred in holding that 
they are entitled to no compensation for that large but unmeasurable 
portion of the value of its rights to construct an office building over 
the Terminal that is said to stem from the efforts of "society 
a~ an organized entity" rather than from the efforts of any private 
party. Lastly, appellants contend that the possibility accorded to 
Penn Central of realizing some value by transferring the Terminal's 
- 6 -
TDR's to other buildings--under a procedure that is acknowledged 
to have many weaknesses--does not meet the 
constitutional requirements of just compensation. 
Appellees simply assert that the constitutional issues which 
appellants seek to raise are insubstantial. Appellees contend 
that where--as they allege to be the case here--a municipal 
~uilding ~ las~on is challenged on economic grounds but it is 
not established that the regulation precludes a reasonable return 
on the value of the building, the owner of the property has not been 
denied due process. 
4. DISCUSSION: A number of state statutes and municipal and 
county ordinances have recently been enacted to preserve historically 
or aesthetically important landmarks. See Juris. Statement, 9 n. 9.The 
pi::'ope.il'.! a;,pr::- ,..:ch co landr!lari.-t preservation has become one of the 
most:discussed issues in ~ecent legal literature. See, e.g., 
✓Note, "The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights," 
84 Yale L.J. 1101 (1975). 
As the N.Y.Ct. App. recognized, however, there are very few 
precedents on the subject. Accordingly the decision below is--on 
important points-all but bereft of supportive authority. 
Especially troublesome are the specific issues emphasized by appellants. 
Most si.1?:nif:i.c;antljT',. aJi.though the N.Y.Ct. App's decision is 
not entirely clear, it does appear to except 1 landmaiks laws 
~ -
from traditional just compensation analysis and create a new 
constitutional category "for the limited purposes of a landmarking 
~ ------- -----------




statute." A. 2-3. The decision evidently holds that a taking 
pursuant to New York City's Landmark Law is unobjectionable if 
the property in question can still provide a "reasonable return" 
for its owner. In other cases where property rights are taken, 
compensation has been required whether or not any remaining 
property interest can still earn a "reasonable return." 
Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1972). 
Closely related to the "reasonable return" aspect of the 
decision below is the N.Y. Ct. App. 's effort to limit I • •• 
compensation to that portion of value created solely by "private" 
efforts. As noted supra, the Court asserted that "there is no 
constitutional imperative that the return [to a property owner] 
embrace all attributes, incidental influences, or contributing exter n 
factors derived from the social complex in which property rests." 
A. 2. This view seems at odds with this Court's definition of proper 
as "the group of rights inherir:1g in the citizen's relation to the 
physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it. 
constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of tnterest 
the citizen may possess." United States v . Genera l Motors Corp., 
323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945). 
The N.Y. Ct. App. 's discussion of Penn Central's TDR's is also 
open to question. The Court acknowledged that the area in which 
, 
transfers are permitted is "severely limited," and that "comple~. 
procedures are required to obtain a transfer permit." A. 13. 
More basically, the Court concedes that the TDR's "may not be the 
- __,, 
- 8 -
equivalent in value to development rights on the original 
site." A. 12. However, the Court appeared to conclude 
that these TDR's may discharge the constitutional requirement 
of compensation for the taking of the Terminal's development 
rights. A. 13-14. iven if this was the tourt's conclusion, 
the rest of the opinion provides ample reason to doubt 
whether the TDR's provide "a full and perfect equivalent 
for the property taken," Monongahela Naviagion Co. v. United States, 
148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893). See also Regional Rail Reorganization Act 
Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 150-151 (1974). 
5. RECO!vlMENDATION: As noted supra, the issues raise~ in this 
case have thus far received little attention in the lower courts, 
., ·_though the number of landmark laws now in effect suggest that they 
will soon be receiving considerable attention. If this case were 
here on cert, the paucity of relevant precedents would be one 
I 
factor militating strongly in favor of a deaial. However, because the 
issue is here on ap~eal, because the case raises issues of constitu-
1 
tional importance, and because the opinion below is--on several, 
material points--questionable, summary action would be - '-' 
inappropriate. Probable jurisdiction should be noted and the case 
set for oral argument. 
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April 15, 1978 
RE: No. 77-444, Penn Central Transp. Co. v. 
City of New York 
As we have discussed, this is a very difficult 
case. It is difficult partly because it is unique, and 
cannot be fit neatly into either the "taking" framework or 
the "police power regulation" framework. It is also ----------------------
difficult because there are strong interests on both sides 
of the question. On the one hand is the constitutionally 
protected value of private property; on the other hand is 
the country's interest, perceived by the federal 
government, all the states, and many localities, in 
preserving our national heritage. Once destroyed, it could 
2. 
not be regained. Because it is highly unlikely that cities 
and states will have the resources to pay just compensation 
if a landmark designation (with its attendant restrictions 
on use and alteration of the property) is considered a 
taking, this case could determine the future of landmarks 
preservation in this country. In addition, it could have 
collateral effects on environmental regulation and various 
other forms of land use regulation. 
I have read just about all the main cases cited by 
the parties and have looked at some of the law review 
material. What emerges is general confusion and a .... --
recognition by both the courts and the commentators that 
there is no simple test for determining whether a 
particular governmental action is a taking or not. I will 
mention some of the tests briefly but will not try to 
determine whether any one of them should be dispositive. 
One thing should be remembered in analyzing the 
issue in this case. While I stated above that this case 
pits the value of private property against the value of 
historic preservation, that really is an over-
simplification. Even if the New York City landmarks law is · 
~ .... ,nM\ 
considered regualation, rather than a taking, it still must 
be evaluated under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. That is, a holding that this is not a taking 
which requires the payment of just compensation is just one 
step. Then the property owner still would be able to argue 
• 
that the regulation is so onerous as to amount to a 
3 • 
deprivation of his property without due process of law. 
Because that additional safeguard exists even if the law is 
not held to be a taking, the value of private property 
still has protection. 
I. Is this a "taking" or a form of regulation? 
This is the ~ritical question in the case. It is T~ 
~.-. 
critical because when the government "takes" property for 1 
public use, it must pay the private owner "just 
compensation". If the landmarks law is classified as 
regulation, on the other hand, the regulation need only be 
reasonable and must not amount to a deprivation of property 
"without due process of law". In the latter case, if the 
property affected by regulation is left with some 
reasonable use, there has not been a deprivation of 
property without due process; and no compensation need be 
paid. 
Unfortunately, some of the briefs start from the 
premise that this is a taking or that it is regulation, 
depending on which side the brief is arguing, and do not 
explain how we are supposed to know whether something is a 
taking or a form of regulation. This difficulty is 
understandable because the courts have had difficulty over 
the years determining whether a particular law effected a 
taking or not. 
This Court has said that when regulation passes 
certain line, it becomes a taking. Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
4. 
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (Holmes, J.). The problem is 
in determing where that line is. There are certain 
instances in which it is clear that there has been a 
taking. The clearest example is when the government 
actually appropriates private property for its own use, 
~-, to build a highway, a government post office, or an 
airport. This clearly is a taking because the government 
proceeds by eminent domain and there is a transfer of title 
from the private property owner to the government. 
Penn Central argues that the effect on their /~~t..t,..~ 
property in this case i1s the same as if the government had 
taken title to the air rights over Grand Central Terminal, 
and therefore it is a taking. I do not find this argument 
persuasive. Under the landmarks law, New York City (the ,,134-~ 
City) cannot do anything with the air rights over .~f ap9 cl•e.,,v~ l1!(1!, 
1~1,I~~ • A_;:/;,r 
Central any more than Penn Central can. Aside from the _, :e. L,:1/-""'-1 
fact that there has been no formal transfer of title, the ~<t•'c.:• <.. -w.o 
City does not possess the incidents of ownership of the a~-~ 
rights. For example, it cannot build an office building 
over the Terminal. The most the City can do (and what it 
has done) is to prohibit certain uses of the air rights. ---------This is typically what happens when the government 
regulates. 
Another form of taking occurs when the 
does not acquire the title to private property 
physically invades the property. This amounts 
.:B~~ 
governmen~ ~ 6.-
".l-J~~-~ ~ ... ,1._/. 
but ~~- --u I 0 
- -71---,~~-
to taking an~~. 
easement. The easement need not be a permanent invasion of €:~ 1 · 
A--~ ... J 




through one's land. It also occurs when the government's 
darn causes flooding on the private property owner's 
.,, =-----~ ..., , 
property and makes it unusable. United States v. Cress, 
243 U.S. 316 {1917). It happens even when the government 
invades the air rights over property by means of low-flying 
l/JtA/ 
J-44 
airplanes on their approach to a public airport. Griggs v. fa-l~ 
----"''-"'---..J -> 
Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 {1962): United States v. 
Causby, 328 u. S. 256 {1946) • 
Penn Central relies heavily on these last two ~ 
cases ~ na@ because they involve air righ~.: 
as doe~ stant case. Penn Central relies on the ~ . 
observation in Causby that a taking occurred there because ~ 
~.(,,c ,~_.(... 
"[t]he owner's right to possess and exploit the land--that G'.--c.«z:..-,i 
is to say, his beneficial owenrship of it", was limited. 
And in Griggs the Court {per Douglas, J.), said that "the 
use of land presupposes the use of some of the airspace 
above it .... Otherwise no home could be built, no tree 
planted, no fence constructed, no chimney erected." Penn 
Central attempts to glean from these cases the proposition 
that a limitation on the potential development of air 
rights component of the property amounts to a taking. 
I do not read those cases that way. ----
' written as physical intrusion cases where the 
ruined the value of the use that originally was being 
of the property, the same as if the property had been 
flooded or had a highway run through it. In other words, 
the Court looked at the effect on the owner's previous use 
--<-
6. 
of the property (in Causby, as a chicken farm; in Griggs, 
as a private residence); the observation that the ownership 
of land encompasses the right to the air space over it was 
part and parcel of the discussion of the owner's enjoyment 
of the land free from physical invasion. Thus, the Causby 
Court said: 
"We would not doubt that, if the United States 
erected an elevated railway over respondents' land 
at the precise altitude where its planes now fly, 
there would be a partial taking .... The 
reason is that there would be an intrusion so 
immediate and direct as to subtract from the 
owenr's full enjoyment of the property and to 
limit his exploitation of it. While the owner 
does not in any physical manner occupy that 
stratum of airspace or make use of it in the 
conventional sense, he does use it in somewhat the 
same sense that space left between buildings for 
the purpose of light and air is used. The 
superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so 
close to the land that continuous invasions of it 
affect the use of the surface of the land itself. 
We think that the landowner, as an incident to his 
ownership, has a claim to it and that invasions of 
it are in the same category as invasions of the 
surface." 
328 U.S., at 264-65. Here the City has not invaded the 
airspace over the Grand Central Terminal at all. The 
..._ ---------------------------
Griggs and Causby cases therefore do not control. ~~ 
h h h b · · of the "' Went ere as een no appropr1at1on a-,u,ff,i~'7J.-riw:t.....,.,C4/~ 
~ ~ property for the government's use or physical invasion of 
/~~ h '' Hc.•tl--L a-'<-
~ ~ property by the government, several tests have been 4~~~ 
1~ used to determine whether regulation is confiscatory and /:,, ;£4,..,,.,,.; J.... '. ________ -....,________ ~ -c., ~
~ ~:1ore constitutes a taking. One test poses the "-""-~ cr-~on whether the government is attempting through 
~ r~guw ion to prevent a harm to the public (in which case 
regulation for a public purpose) or to 
confer a benefit on society (in which case it would be a 
taking for public use). This is the distinction between 
public purpose and public use. Penn Central quotes the 




"[T] he state takes property by eminent domain IA..-~~ 
because it is useful to the public, and under the ,--____, 
police power because it is harmful . . . . From LL• «~ 
this results the difference between the power of ./-o fa.I c.-,~ 
eminent domain and the police power, that the 
,. ~ ---. former recognizes a right to compensation, while 
the latter on principle does not." 
Obviously, measures to preserve the health and 
safety of the community are traditional police power 
&,v~ • ,r 
~ w 
~i-0 
measures. Thus in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), 
law prohibiting the manufacture of liquor was held not to 
be a taking because it was a valid exercise of the police 
power to preserve the health of the community. Similarly, 
if a certain product were banned and this completely 
deprived a piece of property of all its value, it still 
would be considered regulation and not a taking. Finally, 
zoning regulations that are considered necessary to the 
community's well-being (such as prohibiting noxious uses in 
residential neighborhoods) comes under the police power and 
is considered non-compensable regulation. 
Penn Central argues that landmarks preservation 
involves the 1breation of a public good ~rather than the 
prohibition of a harmful use and therefore is not police 
power regulation. This is because the erection of a 
SO-story office building in midtown Manhattan cannot be 
8 • 
considered dangerous or otherwise injurious to the public 
when the regular zoning laws permit it and there are such 
buildings all around the Grand Central property. While 
this is a good point, it should not be dispositive. ----------the distinction between public good and harm to the public 
has been criticized because preventing harm and promoting 
good really are two sides of the same coin, although I will 
concede that there often will be more common agreement 
about what constitutes a nuisance than what constitutes a 
public benefit. (Yet it seems to me that preserving our 
national heritage is something most people would agree is a 
valid and important goal.) Second, the distinction has 
been eroded over the years as the police power has expanded -- - ,,, 
to include r~gulation promoting aesthetic and other values 
affecting the "quality of life" in addition to preventing 
health hazards, etc. See, ~..!..9.·, Village of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). I think it is too late to say p~ 
that regulation in furtherance of the public good is not a ~ 
valid police power objective. Especially when the quality r::-..~ 
of our natu~ urb;;-environments is a prime concern of ~• f-J'-
the community at large, government should not be denied the~, 
power to regulate and be consigned to exercising eminentd-a-~~ 
domain. ~ -
Another test is the diminution in value test. -This test looks to see whether the value of the property 
has been decreased markedly. Under this test, Penn Central~~ 
has a very strong argument. It has been deprived of the 
9. 
revenue from the proposed office building. (Penn Central . - ~ 
was supposed to get $1 million per year during the 
construction of the building and $3 million per year 
thereafter. I think the lease is for 50 years.) It has 
lost all of that value. -~----------,~ ~ But I am not persuaded even by 
this argument. Conceptually, it makes a lot of sense. 
When the decrease in the value of the property is so 
apparent, a taking seems to be present. The flaw, however, 
is that all regulation--and particularly zoning 
regulation--diminishes the value of the property from what 
its value would be if put to its "highest and best use". 
The magnitude of the diminution will vary, of 
course, but this Court and other courts have upheld extreme 
diminutions in value resulting from zoning and other laws. 
The ~ oldblatt case, which you mentioned yesterday, involved 
a law in the Town of Hempstead prohibiting the carrying on 
of the business of excavating for gravel. The property 
owner in that case lost his whole business and almost the 
whole value of the land, which already had been excavated 
substantially. Height restrictions on buildings result in 
a decrease in value because the property owner cannot get 
the income from the highest building it could build without 
restrictions. 
The governing principle seems to be that 
regulation resulting in a diminution in value is not a 
taking unless "its effects are so complete as to deprive 
the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject 
matter." United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 
373, 378 (1945). "[N]ot every governmental act which 
ultimately destroys property rights constitutes a 
compensable taking of those rights." Armstrong v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 40, 50 (1964). (This proposition was 
stated in the dissenting opinion but the majority and 
dissent agreed on the principle but disagreed as to its 
10. 
application to the particular case.) The key seems to be I 
whether the property owner still can make use of this 
property and can obtain a reasonable return from it. 
b . d'ff b h ' . a. ti,u~J-uv.., A 19 1 erence etween t e ordinary zoning case~---'- , ~--~ 
and the landmarks situation is that in the former, several~ ..t,,,:..,.tJ~.,.;.L 
\.4., ~ 
reasonable uses usually will remain for property even when 
H.t.t.L~ 
a particular use has been ruled out by law. In the ~
landmarks case, the owner of the property is restricted to ~¥~ 
one use of the property. But this is no different from the ~. ___________ ..., ___ _ 
case of a non-conforming use in zoning. If an area is 
zoned residential and I own a gas station in the midst of 
it, I have only two options: I can continue to use the 
property as a gas station (as a prior non-conforming use) 
or I can turn the property into residential property. I 
cannot make any other use of it. And here, Penn Central 
has used its property as a railroad terminal for the past 
65 years (since 1913) and still receives a reasonable 
11. 
return on it. 1 
The final theory_ (or test) for determining whether 
..... ~ t..wa-0 
a particular governmental action is a form of valid police , ~-
power regulation or a taking is the "proportionality"  - ---- -
test. Under that test, we look to the burdens and benefits 
of the action. A standard justification for zoning is that 
each piece of property affected is both benefitted and 
burdened by the zoning. Along with the diminution of value 
point, this is the main point pressed by Penn Central. It 
argues that landmarks legislation, unlike zoning, singles 
out certain properties and imposes on them the whole 
burden, with none (or very few) of the benefits, of 
historic preservation. This is the basic fairness 
argument, which says that an individual or particular 
property owner should not be made to pay for a benefit to 
society or to shoulder an undue burden of a public benefit. -
1. In its brief, Penn Central criticizes the 
determination of the N.Y. Court of Appeals that the Penn 
Central failed to prove that it does not receive a 
reasonable return on the Terminal property. Penn Central 
takes issue with a variety of the rules adopted by the 
Court of Appeals as to valuation, such as the imputation of 
the rental value of the space used for railroad operations 
and the very novel theory of subtracting the value 
contributed by society to the base on which the return is -;>_ .... /. J. 
\
calculated. Although the Court of Appeals' analysis seems ~ 
to be flawed as a matter of basic property law, this 
qqestiQD is not before this Court. In a very stupTd 
strategic move, ~enn Central did not appeal the Court of ~-
Appeals' computation of reasonable return, and that ~.M 
question therefore is not before this Court. See Brief for -, 
Appellants 8 n. 7. For purposes of this decision, we must ~
( 
acce t the determination of the Court of A eals that Penn 
C ntra c ve a reasona le return on the Gran 
Central property from its use as a ra1 road terminal. 
12. 
What the just compensation clause prevents against is the 
"capacity of some collective actions to imply that someone 
may be subjected to immediately disadvantageous or painful 
treatment for no other apparent reason, and in accordance 
with no othr apparent principle than that someone else's 
claim to satisfaction has been ranked as intrinsically 
superior to his own." Michelman, Property, Utility, and 
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just 
Compensation" Law," 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1186 (1967), 
quoted in Brief for Appellants 29-30 n. 25. Penn Central 
reasons: "Here, preserving the cultural significance of 
Grand Central was deemed by the Landmarks Commission to be 
'intrinsically superior' to the Penn Central's desire to 
utilize its air rights. In such circumstances, designating 
Grand Central as a landmark constitutes a taking." Id. 
I would not deny that Penn Central has a strong 
fairness argument. But it seems to me that the argument -------.~ -- -
proves too much, because it really does cast doubt (and 
perhaps threaten) ~ zoning law. ~ t.,;i/- r 
First, Penn Central's assumption (or at least the 
way it attempts to portray the situation) is that it has 
been "singled out" for detrimental treatment. Penn Central 
buttresses this description with its analogy to "spot 
zoning". But spot zoning is arbitrary, whereas the 
landmarks law is not. The landmarks law is a comprehensive 
plan affecting all of New York City and under which 
~~~~~ 
~~...-c~ .,~"'IA,,,..__, ~ ~ ? 
hundreds of buildings have been designated as 
landmarks. 2 Penn Central makes a big mistake when it 
concedes that historic district legislation, such as that 
in New Orleans to preserve the French Quarter (see Maher 
City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (CA 5 1976), cert. 
denied, 426 U.S. 905), is valid because, like zoning, it 






.&u,. '-"-' "1L. 
property. I do not think it should make a difference, as a 
constitutional matter, whether all the landmarks are 
contiguous or are spread -out all around the City. The key 
inquiry is whether the plan is rational. With traditional - ~~-------=;.._-------
zoning, it would be irrational not to treat all the 
property in a given area similarly, because that is the 
whole point of zoning for different uses. With landmarks 
preservation, however, the rational criterion is whether 
the property has aesthetic, historic, or cultural value and 
therefore ought to be preserved. As long as there are 
objective criteria for landmarks designation, the plan is 
as rational and comprehensive as the traditional zoning 
plan or the historic district legislation. And the effect 
on the individual property owner within the zoned area or 
2. Of course, as Penn Central notes, many of these 
buildings already are owned by the public. But I am sure 
that many of them are privately owned. If you are 
interested, I will try to obtain the list of New York City A/~ 
landmarks. But I think we can assume that as a general 
matter landmarks legislation will affect both public and 
private property . 
• 
14. 
the historic district, in terms of being restricted in the 
use of its property, is the same as the effect on Penn 
Central as the owner of a single, free-standing landmark. 
Penn Central says the effect is not the same, in 
terms of this proportionality of burdens and benefits 
theory, because it does not receive the benefit. But this 
is not true. 3 I agree that the proportionality is not 
as apparent as in the case of zoning, but the value of the 
Penn Central property is enhanced by being located in New 
York City, which, among other things, has a substantial 
tourist industry which doubtless would be diminshed if the 
City contained nothing but glass office buildings. People 
come to New York partly because of its historic and 
cultural attractions. Thus although the benefit is quite 
intangible, it nonetheless is there. In addition, Penn -- .,,,... 
Central is in a very bad position to complain that it does 
not receive the benefits of the landmarks law. This is not 
a principle of general applicability, and it might not be 
that significant, but it is undeniable that Penn Central 
owns a lot of hotel property in the Grand Central 
n:..ighborh~ d. These hotels depend not only on the business 
trade but also on the tourist trade. {This point is not 
3. In addition, it too proves too much. The owner of 
property on the border of two zones,~-, residential and 
commercial, is burdened as much as the owner in the midst 
of the residential district but does not benefit as much. 
He is surrounded on one side by commercial property but 
cAnnot put his own property to the more lucrative 
commercial use. 
15. 
defeated by the fact that Penn Central is selling some of 
its hotel property; _ · the purchase 
price undoubtedly comprises the value of being located in 
midtown Manhattan where tourists visit.) Thus whatever 
might be the case of the owner of a single piece of 
property, Penn Central really cannot argue that it does not 
benefit from the landmarks law. 
A final word on this proportionality pro~lem: the ------~-----------
Goldblatt case involved a general safety law, couched in 
general terms, prohibiting excavation. But in fact the 
burden of the ordinance would fall only on a few property 
owners whose property was located near the shore of the 
Long Island Sound because, Ruth informs me, gravel pits 
exist only near water. Thus the ordinance in Goldblatt 
could have been viewed as a taking as much as the New 
City landmarks law, if Penn Central's theory were to 
prevail. 
In sum, although the question is far from easy and 
the line is hard to draw, I would view the landmarks 
legislation as valid police power regulation that is not 
confiscatory and therefore is not a taking. I'll add just 
three final observatons on this point. 
(1) Penn Central's brief attempts to convince the 
Court that it would be departing from precedent and fouling 
up property law by affirming the New York Court of 
Appeals. I disagree. While the court's opinion is 
terrible and adopts certain novel and probably erroneous 
16. 
theories, this Court does not have to affirm its 
reasoning. We are concerned with what is correct reasoning 
and with the correctness of the judgment below. (This 
Court can express its disagreement with the reasoning of 
the court below in the opinion, especially about the 
observation that the landmarks law is not a zoning law. 
Perhaps it technically is not a zoning law, but the zoning ·1 
analogy seems more accurate than any other.) According to 
=--~ .... -- .... 
my reading of the cases, this Court has tried over the 
years not to interfere with local and state legislation 
dealing with land use. As new forms of regulation have 
cropped up in response to new problems, created by the 
increasing closeness and complexity of society (especially 
problems dealing with cities, growth, and the environment) 
the courts have been willing to allow them as long as there 
remained so~ use _of, and reasonable return on, the 
property . - .. (2) If the Court holds that this is a taking, I 
think it will call into question various zoning laws and 
new laws directed at preserving the natural environment. 
For example, I've attached a clipping about a town 
ordinance prohibiting property owners from cutting down 
trees over a certain age without permission. Although this 
kind of law obviously will not cause diminutions of 
property such as the one at issue in this case, it is an 
example of zoning that does not apply to contiguous 
• 
property but "singles out" property according to certain 
17. 
objective characteristics. This is exactly like the 
landmarks law. The example I mentioned to you yesterday is 
similar: Assume that New York City decided that it had to 
deal effectively with a glut of office space and a dearth 
of residential housing and recreational facilities. It 
therefore enacted an ordinance absolutely prohibiting any 
more office building development. Again, the law would not 
apply within a certain geographic area and would affect 
some property owners (those owning land they want to 
develop as office buildings), but not others (those owning 
existent office buildings), throughout the city. Yet I 
think this would be upheld as a valid exercise of the 
police power. Similar reasoning would apply to lands 
affected with some special environmental interest. 
(3) All that is involved in this case is the 
landmark's commission's denial of Penn Central's 
application to build a 50-story glass tower on top of Grand 
Central Station. We do not know how the commission would 
rule if Penn Central were to present an architectural 
design resembling the original plans for an office building 
atop the Terminal. See Brief for Appellants 3-4; App. 90 
(showing a picture of the original plan for Grand Central, 
which including a building above it). I am not saying that 
the commission would approve such a plan; but the fact that 
it is conceivable that Penn Central could obtain approval 
to build a more appropriate structure above the 
Terminalmakes it harder to say that Penn Central's property 
actually has been taken. 
II. The significance of th@_7 
This memo has gotten a bit long, so I will not 
give you the extended discussion of the TDR's that I had 
planned. I will make two points, one explanatory and one 
theoretical. 
18. 
In our conversation yesterday I mentioned a little 
bit about how the TDR's operate, in general and under the 
particular New York City scheme. Rather than go into that 
in greater detail here, I'll refer you to appellants' brief 
at 38-42 for a discussion of their basic operation. 
Everyone, including the New York court, seems to agree that 
the New York City TDR plan has significant defects. These 
are, primarily, their speculative nature, the fact that the 
risk of disposing of them is placed on the property owner 
rather than the government, the restrictions placed on 
them, and the administrative burden of obtaining TDR's. 
Some of the restrictiveness of use of the TDR's is 
eliminated under the Chicago plan, see Brief for Appellants 
40 n. 33; and the problems of speculativeness and burden of 
disposal could be solved by the creation of a transferable 
development rights bank, see id. 42 n. 34. These are 
legislative matters, however, where experimentation is 
necessary. 
I agree with appellants that at least the New York 
City TDR's would be insufficient to amount to "just 
compensation" if in fact there has been a taking. The main 
proponent of TDR's (Professor Costonis) has stated that 
TDR's are not "just" compensation but only "fair" 
. 4 
compensation. But even if the Court holds that the 
19. 
4. Costonis has his own new theory for land use, which 
he calls "the accommodation power", which is a midway 
position between eminent domain and the police power. 
Because his theory is formulated out of whole cloth, he 
also invents this new standard of compensation. I did not 
think the Court would be interested in adopting an approach 
that is this unprecedented. 
landmarks law is valid regulation and does not amount to a 
taking, I think the TDR's should play a role. In other 
words, I would be troubled by a holding that said the 
landmarks laws are valid even without the TDR's. Because 
the TDR's provide some benefit to the landowner, it would 
be bad for the Court to give the states an incentive to 
remove the TDR's from their landmarks laws. Since we all 
recognize that the landowner is being burdened even if the 
burden does not amount to a taking, legislatures should be 
encouraged to continue to provide for TDR's and to refine 
them to be a more valuable and less speculative property 
right. 
The best way to do this that I have come across is 
to consider the TDR's as one indicator that the owner still 
obtains a reasonable return from the property and as 
7 
' 
evidence that there has not been a taking. The SG suggests .:5 G-
this approach in his brief at 26 n. 22, where he says: "We 
1 t?ink that the transferable development righs under the 
\ city's law are best seen not as 'compensation' for a 
1 
20. 
'taking' but as a reasonable measure to ensure that 
development rights customarily associated with a parcel of 
property are not taken at all." In other words, in 
response to Penn Central's contention that its property 
right in developing the air rights has been taken 
completely (rather than saying that its use of the whole 
parcel has been limited), the SG says the development 
rights have not been taken but have been altered or 
transferred. In short, as long as there is a reasonable 
return on the portion of the property that already has been 
developed and some alternative form of development right is 
substituted for the air rights, there has been no taking. 
N.B. 
lfp/ss 4/17 8 
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1. Issue: Is New York City landmark law a 
"taking" or is it "regulation"? 
2. The "air rights" argument: 
(a} City does not "take" air rights; no property 
interest. 
(b} What about a darn "flooding"? Low flying 
planes? 
(c} Griggs and Causby involved low flying 
planes: destroyed value of the use then being made for the 
property. Here, previous use not impaired. Nor, any 
physical invasion of air space. 
3. A "regulation" may constitute a "taking". 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 
(a} Question is whether regulation in fact is 
confiscatory. 
(b} "Police power" used to protect public from 
harm (e.g. zoning - public health and safety}; "regulation" 
- if confiscatory - is equivalent to a "taking". A taking 
- eminent domain - creates a public benefit. 
(c} Penn Central says a "benefit" is created here; 
thus police power not involved. 
(d) But police power/benefit theory has been 
eroded. See Village of Belle Terre "quality of life" 
improved by zoning. 
4. "Dimunition in value test". 
(a) Penn Central loses opportunity to enhance 
value. Has its traditional use been diminished? 
(b) Goldblatt - town of Hempstead prohibited 
excavation of gr~~ :2:~=::~t~ business ,t...:/ 
...,._. .,e,J"., ;/,,- -1•C,U. lllt~ V-..,1.., ~ )-,•~ • 
5. Zoning benefits or a f fects an area: a 
landmarks restriction places entire burden on a single 
owner. 
/;,. Proportionality test. 
(a) Both benefits and detriments may flow from 
zoning. Penn Central argues only detriments here. 
(b) Will not landmarks designation and 
preservation benefit adjacent Penn Central real estate. 
(c) Is Penn Central earning a reasonable return 
on Grand Central? New York court held that Penn Central 
failed to prove it was not earning such a return. Is this 
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1. Issue: Is New York City Jandmark 1aw a 
"taking" or is it "regulation"? 
2. The "air rights" argument: 
(a) City does not "take" air rfghts; no property 
interest. " 
(b) What about a dam "flooding"? Low flying 
planes? 
(c) §rigg_~ and Q~!!2Y involved low flying 
planes: destroyed value of the use then being made for the 
property. Here, previous use not impaired. Nor, any 
physical invasion of air space. 
3. A "regulation" may constitute a "taking". 
PennsyJvania_Co~]_fo. v. Mahon. 
(a) Questjon is whether regulation jn fact is 





(b) "Po) icf' power" used to protect pub] ic from 
harm (e.g. zoning public health and ~afety); "regulation" 
- if confiscatory - is equivalent to a "taking". A tak'ng 
- emjnent domain - creates a public benefit. 
(c) Penn Central says a "benefit" is created her~1 
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,. f (d) But police power/benefit theory has been 
e roded. See Villa~of Belle Terre "quality of 
i mproved by zoning. 
4. ·•' "Dimuni tion in value test". 
(a) Penn CentraJ loses opportunity to enhance 
va lue . Has its traditional use been diminished? 
(b) Goldblatt - town of Hempstead prohibited 
excavation of gravel. Owner lost existing business. 
5 . zoning benefits or affects an areai a 
landmarks restriction p]aces entire bur.den on a single 
owner . 
~ - fro;eortionali~y_i~st. 
(a) Both behefits and detriments may fJow 
zoning. Penn Central argues only detr.iments here. 
(b) Will not landmarks designation and · ., 
preservation benefit adjacent 
(c) earning a r easonab 1 e return 
on Grand 
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Memo to Fi.le 
No. 77-444 Penn Central v. City of New York 
• In preparing for the Conference, I have read the ,, 
l, 
,~ ~ following cases - among others: 
(j., 
·t.,. ,! Ji.. 
.. 1· 
"-41 
1. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 u.s. 393 
(1922) a celebrated case in view of the participants: 
John w. Davis ana Henry S. Drinker were counsel for the 
Coal Company: the then Attorney General of Pennsylvania 
(George E. Alter) was out counsel for the state~ the 
opinion was by Holmes and the dissent by Brandeis. 
The statute prescribed the mining of coal and 
other minerals in such a way as to undermine residences, 
public streets or buildings. The Coal Company here held a 
valid lease to coal deposits beneath private residences 
built by owners of the surface. 
~ The statute was viewed as a regulation pursuant to 
the police power (safety). It provided for no 
compensation. 
The Court invalidated the statute, holding that it 
constituted a "taking". It recognized, however, the ~ 
closeness of the issue and the difficulty of enunciating a 







"The general rule at least is, that while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking. It may be doubted how far exceptional 
cases, like the blowing of a house to stop a 
conflagration, go - and if they go beyond the 
general rule, whether they do not stand as much 
upon tradition as upon principle. Bowditch v. 
Boston, 101 U.S. 16. In general it is not plain 
that a man's misfortunes or necessities will 
justify his shifting the damages to his neighbor's 
shoulders • .§.Eede v. 1.Y!ln & Boston R.R. Co., 172 
Mass. 488, 489. We are in danger of forgetting 
that a strong public desite to improve the public 
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the 
desire to a shorter cut than the constitutional 
way of paying for the change. As we already have 
said, this is a question of degree - and therefore 
cannot be disposed of by general propositions." 
260 U.S., 415-416. 
It is to be noted that the.Court acknowledged that 
cases of this kind cannot be disposed of by "general , 'f 
' propositions". The case was characterized as presenting "a 
question of degree" - to be resolved on the facts. 
2. Hadacheck v. Los AngeJes, 239 U.S. 394 
(1915). Los AngeJes, by ordinance made it unlawful to 
operate a brickyard within the city. Petitioner owned a 
tract of land containing "a very valuable bed of clay", 
worth "about $800,000 for brickmaking purpose, but not 
exceeding $60,000 for residential purposes". The Court's 
sustained the ordinance as a valid exercise of police 
power. It construed the ordinance as identifying 






that under the policy power the conducting of certain 
businesses can be found to be nuisances and confined to 
particular localities. The Court relied upon Reinman v. 
Little Roe~, 237 U.S. 171. 
The court noted that the ordinance did not 
prohibit the mining of removal of the clay, but only the 
oper~tion of a brick manufacturing plant. 
3. 
I do not view the case as being particularly 
relevant. It was not cited in Holmes' opinion in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co., although ft was cited by Brandeis in 
dissent • .. 
3. Maher v. City of N!! Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 
(1975). In this case CAS sustained a New Orleans ordinance 
that regulated the preservation and maintenance of 
buildings in the historic Vieux Carre section of the city 
(French Quarter). 
Maher owned a cottage in the French Quarter; 
desired to demoJish it and erect a seven apartment complex 
on the site. · He attached the validity of the ordinance as 
taking his property without compensation and also as a 
denial of due process. 
In a rather elaborate opinion, the Court sustained 


















invalid because it denies the "highest and best use" of the 
property. In emphasizing that whether regulation amounts 
to a taking or denial of due process, is "a matter to be 




"To survive attack as a taking, the zoning 
regulations must - as a threshold matter - satisfy 
the due process requirements that its purpose and 
means are reasonable. Even if it comports with 
due process, a regulatory ordinance may 
nonetheless be a taking if it is unduly onerous so 
as to be confiscatory. The Supreme Court has held 
that every regulation is in some sense a 
prohibition and that whether a given regulation 
treads over the line of proper regulation and 
operates as a taking of property is a matter to be 
determined under all circumstances in a specific 
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April 19, 1978 
Justice Powell, 
This volume contains the Jurisdictional Statement 
~ O and your ma statement opposing jurisdiction in West Bros. 
, 'b v~ I Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria. I found it very interesting--
~ I,, I & this case is almost identical to the Hadacheck case I gave 
Jt:Ji"31 you yesterday. In both cases, the property owner wanted to 
y~e his property, containing valuable clay, in a brick-
or tile-making business. In West Bros. the value of the 
investment was $500,000.00. And, as in Hadacheck, the 
property originally had been outside the city limits. In 
West Bros. the Virginia court upheld the exercise of the 
police power to promote the general welfare as well as to 
get rid of actual threats to health and safety, and while 
noting that the regulation might seem arbitrary as applied 
to neighboring properties, was generally reasonable. The 
appellant in West Bros. seems to have based his argument 
primarily on the unreasonableness of the~ regulation under 
the due process clause, rather than asking for just compen-
that there was a 
sation as a taking; but he could have argued/taking just as 
legitimately as Penn Central has, ~HK for it is clear, as 
it was in Hadacheck, that this was a major restriction on the 
use to which the property had been put and resulted in a 
great loss to the property owner. 
As I said yesterday, the cases in which a taking has 
been found are exceedingly rare. MRiaxxxxkH With the exception 
2. 
of the Pennsylvania Coal case, the Court has denied that 
there has been a taking wixk when faced with almost every 
kind of land use regulation (limiting building height, 
setback requirements, prohibitions of various uses of land--
as in these clay/brick cases and the Goldblatt case, and 
all the various kinds of zoning ordinances). My opinim 
is that the precedent stands firmly behind a conclusion 
that there was no taking in the Penn Central case. 
April 19, 1978 
Memo to File 
No. 77-444 Penn Central v. City of New York 
In preparing for the Conference, I have read the 
following cases - among others: 
1. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 
(1922) - a celebrated case in view of the participants: 
John W. Davis and Henry S. Drinker were counsel for the 
Coal Company; the then Attorney General of Pennsylvania 
(George E. Alter) was out counsel for the state; the 
opinion was by Holmes and the dissent by Brandeis. 
The statute prescribed the mining of coal and 
other minerals in such a way as to undermine residences, 
public streets or buildings. The Coal Company here held a 
valid lease to coal deposits beneath private residences 
built by owners of the surface. 
The statute was viewed as a regulation pursuant to 
the police power (safety). It provided for no 
compensation. 
The Court invalidated the statute, holding that it 
constituted a "taking". It recognized, however, the 
closeness of the issue and the difficulty of enunciating a 
general rule: 
2. 
"The general rule at least is, that while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking. It may be doubted how far exceptional 
cases, like the blowing of a house to stop a 
conflagration, go - and if they go beyond the 
general rule, whether they do not stand as much 
upon tradition as upon principle. Bowditch v. 
Boston, 101 U.S. 16. In general it is not plain 
that a man's misfortunes or necessities will 
justify his shifting the damages to his neighbor's 
shoulders. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. R. Co., 172 
Mass. 488, 489. We are in danger of forgetting 
that a strong public desite to improve the public 
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the 
desire to a shorter cut than the constitutional 
way of paying for the change. As we already have 
said, this is a ~estion of degree - and therefore 
cannot be dis:gose oi: i5y general propositions." 
260 u .'"s., trs aTB. -- -
It is to be noted that the Court acknowledged that 
cases of this kind cannot be disposed of by "general 
propositions". The case was characterized as presenting "a 
question of degree" - to be resolved on the facts. 
2. Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 
(1915). Los Angeles, by ordinance made it unlawful to 
operate a brickyard within the city. Petitioner owned a 
tract of land containing "a very valuable bed of clay", 
I 
worth "about $800,000 for brickmaking purpose, but not 
exceeding $60,000 for residential purposes". The Court's 
sustained the ordinance as a valid exercise of police 
power. It construed the ordinance as identifying 
brickyards as "nuisances in fact and law", and held 
that under the policy power the conducting of certain 
businesses can be found to be nuisances and confined to 
particular localities. The Court relied upon Reinman v. 
Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171. 
The Court noted that the ordinance did not 
prohibit the mining of removal of the clay, but only the 
operation of a brick manufacturing plant. 
3. 
I do not view the case as being particularly 
relevant. It was not cited in Holmes' opinion in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co., although it was cited by Brandeis in 
dissent. 
3. Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 
(1975). In this case CA5 sustained a New Orleans ordinance 
that regulated the preservation and maintenance of 
buildings in the historic _vieux Carre section of the city 
(French Quarter). 
Maher owned a cottage in the French Quarter; 
desired to demolish it and erect a seven apartment complex 
on the site. He attached the validity of the ordinance as 
taking his property without compensation and also as a 
denial of due process. 
In a rather elaborate opinion, the Court sustained 
the ordinance. It held that a zoning ordinance is not 
' . 
4. 
invalid because it denies the "highest and best use" of the 
property. In emphasizing that whether regulation amounts 
to a taking or denial of due process, is "a matter to be 
detemined under all the circumstances in a specific case": 
ss 
"To survive attack as a taking, the zoning 
regulations must - as a threshold matter - satisfy 
the due process requirements that its purpose and 
means are reasonable. Even if it comports with 
due process, a regulatory ordinance may 
nonetheless be a taking if it is unduly onerous so 
as to be confiscatory. The Supreme Court has held 
I 
that every regulation is in some sense a 
prohibition and that whether a given regulation 
treads over the line of proper reg·ulation and 
operates as a taking of property is a matter to be 
determined under all circumstances in a specific 
case." 516 F.2d, at 1065. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
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$5ttpt'mtt <!fimrt ttf tlrt 'Jlittitt~ $,httts 
:WasfringLm. :!fl. <!f. 2.llffe)l.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE June 2, 1978 
Re: 77-444 - Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co., v. City of NY 
Dear Bill, 
I agree. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 





.. ... ,., 
CHAMBERS OF' 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Dear Bill: 
;§u.prtttU {!Jourl of tqt ~b ;§taftg 
~ru;lpttghtn. ,. QJ. 20ffe~, 
June 5, 1978 
Re: Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New Yorl 
I join_your dissent. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
inttrtmt <!}cu.rt cf tlrt ~ttitt~ j;ta:tts 
'Dhtsftingfon. JD. <!}. 2llgil1;4 
CHAMl!IERS Or' 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June S, 1978 
Re: No. 77-444 - Penn Central Transp. Co. v. 
City of New York 
Dear Bill: 
Please join rre. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc; The Conference 
Sincerely, 




JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~nprtutt QJ.ttnrl of tfrt ~~ ~bdtg 
'Jllru1fyhtgi~ J. QJ. 2llffe'!-~ 
June 6, 1978 
77-444, Penn Central v. New York 
Dear Bill, 
I am glad to join your opinion 
for the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
,., 
-. 
June 14, 1978 
No. 77-444 Penn Central v. New York 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
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JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.§np-rtuu ~om± of tqt ~nitth- .§htltg 
~ru'flrmgfon:. 10. ~- 20.;r"', / 
June 15, 1978 
Re: No. 77 -444 - Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. City of New York 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
'• 
ro: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Nancy 
RE: Penn Central 
June 15, 1978 
I spoke to Dave Carpenter about the final footnote 
in this opinion, and he said he would see if his boss would 
be willing to leave it in in its present state. That would 
require some negotiation with BRW, however, (or at least his 
clerk), so the final content of the footnote is up in the air. 
I told Dave, though, that you felt strongly that counsel's 
concession should be included. 
~u:prmu QJ01trl o-f flr~ ~lt ~bdt• 
';Jll'N#Jrm:ghnt. ~. QJ. 2llffe~, 
CHAMBERS or 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 16, 1978 
Re: 77-444 - Penn Central v. New York 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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June 22, 1978 
Justice Powell, 
I've asked Dave Carpenter, and he has agreed, to make 
the changes indicated on the attached revision of Penn Central. 
I was afraid that the language used by WJB might be construed 
to mean that land use controls, including historic preservation, 
are constitutional as long as they are "reasonably related to 
the implementation of a policy ••• expected to produce a 
widespread public benefit", without more,even though the rest 
of the opinion discusses various other requirements for 
iaRBXHKH historic preservation laws to be constitutional. 
I think the change helps somewhat. I had thought that this 
note was going to be changed only to reflect the idea that 
what is a "noxious use" is an amorphous concept; this idea is 
stated in the second paragraph 
If you have any proble 
written, I'll convey it 
version, as amended, to 
is is presently 
He is sending the present 
today. 
~ttpttutt C!Jcu:rt cf flrt 'Jfutit.ch jtaf.t.G 
~rurlp:ngfon, ~- C!J. 211ffe)l.~ 
CHAMeERS Of" 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 77-444--Penn Central v. New York City 
In addition to the changes marked in the draft circulated 
today, June 21st, I plan, absent dissent, to make the following 
additional changes: 
(1) Add the following language to footnote 27: 
(2) 
Similarly, Welch, Goldblatt, and Gorieb illustrate the 
fallacy of appellants' related contention that a "taking" 
must be found to have occurred whenever the land use 
restriction may be characterized as imposing a "servi~ude" 
on the claimant's parcel. ~Lo~ 
Rewrite footnote 30 to read as follo  ... _ 
Appellants attempt to distinguish cases on the ground 
that, in each, Government was proh biting a "noxious" use 
of land and that in the present c se, in contrast, 
appellants' proposed construction above the Terminal would 
be beneficial. We observe that th uses in issue in 
Hadacheck, Miller, and Goldblatt w re perfectly lawful in 
themselves. They involved no "bla eworthiness, ..• moral 
wrongdoing, or conscious act of da gerous risk-taking which 
induce[d society] to shift the cos to a particular 
individual." Sax, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 50 (1964). These cases 
are better understood as resting n ton any supposed 
"noxious" quality of the prohibite uses but rather on the 
())ere. L__._jg~r~o~u!n~d9-__!t~h~a~tL~~~~~~~~~~~~f!~zrryp-<JS1ITT'i-;,,;wry1~"fO"rrt~~~c:) 
compensation, whe~the restrictio s reasonably relatep 
to the implementation of a policy -like historic ~ UAi-
preservation--that~be exp~ctea ) :2 p ; oduce a ~wide_j£~ ea~ 1 
public benefit ~ ~ ~oJ-0~  
Nor, corr~latively, can it be asserted that f he · 
destr tion or fundamental alteration of a historic 
landmark is "beneficial." The suggestion that the 
beneficial quality of appellant's proposed construction is 
established by the fact the construction would have been 
consistent with appplicable zoning laws ignores the 
development in sensibilities and ideals reflected in 
landmark legislation like New York City's. Cf. West 
,Brother Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 282-283, 
a eal dismissed for want of a substantial federal 
ques 10n, 
WJB, Jr. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 77-444--Penn Central v. New York City 
In addition to the changes marked in the draft circulated 
today, June 21st, I plan, absent dissent, to make the following 
additional changes: 
(1) Add the following language to footnote 27: 
Similarly, Welch, Goldblatt, and Gorieb illustrate the 
fallacy of appellants ' related contention that a "taking" 
must be found to have occurred whenever the land use 
restriction may be characterized as imposing a "servitude" 
on the claimant's parcel. ' 
(2) Rewrite footnote 30 to read as follows: 
30. Appellants attempt to distinguish these cases on the 
ground that, in each, Government was prohibiting a 
"noxious" use of land and that in the present case, in 
contrast, appellants' proposed construction above the 
Terminal would be beneficial. We observe that the uses in 
issue in Hadacheck, Miller, and Goldblatt were perfectly 
lawful in themselves. They involved no "blameworthiness, 
•.. moral wrongdoing, or conscious act of dangerou~ 
risk-taking which induce[d society] to shift the cost to a 
particular individual." Sax, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 50 (1964). 
These cases are better understood as resting not on any 
supposed "noxious" quality of the prohibited uses but 
rather on the ground that the restrictions were reasonably 
related to the implementation of a policy--not unlike 
historic preservation--expected to produce a widespread 
public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated 
property. 
Nor, correlatively, can it be asserted that the 
destruction or fundamental alteration of a historic 
landmark is not harmful. The suggestion that the 
beneficial quality of appellant's proposed construction is 
established by the fact the construction would have been 
consistent with appplicable zoning laws ignores the 
development in sensibilities and ideals reflected in 
landmark legislation like New York City's. Cf. West 
Brother Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 282-283, 
appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal 
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